The Dispute Between Zimri and Pinchas
The Gemara in Berachot 32a offers different ‘proof texts’ to show that Moshe Rabbeinu spoke somewhat impertinently [הֵטִיחַ דְּבָרִים כְּלַפֵּי מַעְלָה, literally, ‘he threw his words upward’] to Ha-Kadosh, baruch Hu when he sought to defend B’nei Yisrael on account of their sins. One such case was in defense of Klal Yisrael after they sinned in the matter of the eigel ha-zahav [עגל הזהב, golden calf]. Seeing an allusion in the words וְדִי זָהָב [v’di zahav, ‘and enough gold’] from Devarim 1:1, the School of R’ Yannai taught that Moshe Rabbeinu claimed that Hashem should be held, at least, partially responsible for the sin of the eigel ha-zahav: כָּךְ אָמַר מֹשֶׁה לִפְנֵי הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: רִבּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם, בִּשְׁבִיל כֶּסֶף וְזָהָב שֶׁהִשְׁפַּעְתָּ לָהֶם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, עַד שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״דַּי״ — הוּא גָּרַם שֶׁעָשׂוּ אֶת הָעֵגֶל (Thus Moshe said before Ha-Kadosh, baruch Hu: Master of the World, because of the silver and gold that You lavished upon Yisrael, until they said ‘Enough!’ — this [or ‘He’] caused them to make the eigel).
Expanding on this idea, R’ Chiya bar Abba said in the name of R’ Yochanan (Berachot 32a): מָשָׁל לְאָדָם אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ בֵּן. הִרְחִיצוֹ וְסָכוֹ, וְהֶאֱכִילוֹ וְהִשְׁקָהוּ, וְתָלָה לוֹ כִּיס עַל צַוָּארוֹ, וְהוֹשִׁיבוֹ עַל פֶּתַח שֶׁל זוֹנוֹת. מַה יַּעֲשֶׂה אוֹתוֹ הַבֵּן שֶׁלֹּא יֶחֱטָא (This is comparable to a man who had a son. He washed him, anointed him [with oil], fed him and gave him to drink, hung a purse [full of money] around his neck, and sat him at the door of a brothel. What can that son do to avoid sinning?). The nimshal is plain enough. Hashem is the man and Yisrael is His son. Lavishing Yisrael with all of the gold and silver of Egypt is like feeding a son, giving him to drink, putting a purse filled with money around his neck, and then sitting him in front of a brothel! The teaching is obvious. It was practically impossible, if not completely impossible, for Yisrael not to have sinned in the matter of the eigel.
These statements of Chazal deal head on with the issue of bechirah chofshit [בחירה חופשית, free will] and teach some things which may be difficult to accept at first. Nevertheless, let’s explore this topic a little and see if we can expand our understanding.
In the wake of the terrible sin of Yisrael joining itself to the idol Ba’al Pe’or, Zimri ben Salu, a prince from the Tribe of Shimon, took a Midianite princess, Cozbi bat Tzur, and had intimate relations with her, and the whole congregation of B’nei Yisrael knew full well what was going on. Pinchas ben Elazar took a spear, went into the tent, and thrust it through the two of them impaling them at the very location of their intimacy. Most of the time, we tend to focus on Pinchas and discuss how he was able to do such a thing, considering that he acted extra-judicially. Nevertheless, the Torah testifies that Pinchas acted correctly and was rewarded for his zeal with an eternal covenant of peace (Bamidbar 25:5-15). But here, we want to put some of the focus on Zimri and ask a seemingly simple question, How was he able to do such a thing?
R’ Mordechai Yosef Leiner, the ‘Ishbitzer Rebbe’, founder of the Izhbitza-Radzin chasidic dynasty writes at length about this subject in his well-known work Mei ha-Shiloach. He says the following (Chelek 1, Pinchas): ולא יעלה ח”ו על הדעת לומר שזמרי היה נואף ח”ו כי מן הנואף לא עשה הקב”ה פרשה בתורה (Don’t think to say, chas v’shalom, that Zimri was an adulterer, chas v’shalom, for Ha-Kadosh, baruch Hu, would not make a parashah in the Torah out of an adulterer). He goes on to explain that there is deep secret to the entire episode. And what is that secret? There are ten levels to lewdness or licentious behavior. The first level is when a man gets himself dressed up and heads to the red light district in his town to find a prostitute with whom he is pleased. In other words, the man voluntarily, consciously and purposefully draws down the Yetzer ha-Ra to himself in order to commit a sin. However, if he realizes that his actions constitute a crime against Hashem and he begins to guard himself from the Yetzer ha-Ra little by little, he’ll begin to go up from one level to the next. But this spiritual ascension comes at a price. As he ascends in levels, his bechirah diminishes. This may seem a little counter-intuitive at first, but if you think about it, you’ll see that it makes perfectly good sense. Just think of the malachim. They exist at a very high level of kedushah and consequently, have very limited (if any practical) bechirah. How come? The reality of Hashem’s existence is just so obvious to them.
Another way of understanding this is that the point of bechirah ascends along with the individual. At the lowest level, his bechirah is whether to have relations with the prostitute. As he gains awareness of sin and develops a sense of shame, he goes from being challenged with that choice to being challenged with whether or not to watch lewd videos. As he continues to increase in awareness and shame, his bechirah ascends to the point of whether he should look at scantily clad women in the street. And so on and so on. When he moves to higher levels, the temptations that he had at lower levels no longer tempt him. The lust that he once had to hire a prostitute will have disappeared. It’s just not an option anymore. It’s completely out of the question. How come? What happened? His temptations became more refined. In other words, as he ascends in his shemirah, his bechirah diminishes.
But this is not just a two dimensional dynamic. There’s a third dimension to it. At the same time that he is ascending from level to level, it becomes increasingly difficult for him to escape from sin. As we’ve already explained, it’s not that it’s more difficult to escape from the sin at the first level. Obviously, that gets easier. However, it gets harder and harder to escape from the temptation at the level that he has risen to! This is the explanation behind the teaching of R’ Yehudah in the Gemara (Succah 52a): לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא, מְבִיאוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיֵצֶר הָרָע, וְשׁוֹחֲטוֹ בִּפְנֵי הַצַּדִּיקִים וּבִפְנֵי הָרְשָׁעִים. צַדִּיקִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּהַר גָּבוֹהַּ, וּרְשָׁעִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּחוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה (In the future, Ha-Kadosh, baruch Hu, will bring the Yetzer ha-Ra and slaughter it before the righteous and the wicked. It will appear to the righteous as a high mountain, but to the wicked as a strand of hair). Similarly, it is taught there: כׇּל הַגָּדוֹל מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, יִצְרוֹ גָּדוֹל הֵימֶנּוּ (Whoever is greater than his fellow, his Yetzer is greater than his fellow). So we see that as he rises in kedushah, the Yetzer ha-Ra rises right along with him becoming more and more powerful, and thus, more and more difficult to defeat.
After explaining all these ideas, the Mei ha-Shiloach then discusses what can happen when someone reaches the tenth level, the highest level of shemirah possible: מי שמרחיק עצמו מן היצה”ר ושומר עצמו מן העבירה בכל כוחו עד שאין ביכולתו לשמור א”ע יותר מזה, ואז כשנתגבר יצרו עליו ועושה מעשה אז הוא בודאי רצון הש”י (Someone who distances himself from the Yetzer ha-Ra and guards himself from sin with all of his power until it’s impossible to guard himself more than this, and then when his Yetzer overpowers him and he does the deed, then for sure, it is the will of Hashem, may He be blessed). Now that’s deep.
Let’s now return to the topic at hand – Zimri. Continuing, the Mei ha-Shiloach writes: כי זמרי היה באמת שומר עצמו מכל התאוות הרעות, ועתה עלתה בדעתו שהיא בת זוגו מאחר שאין בכוחו לסלק א”ע מזה המעשה (For Zimri had truly guarded himself from all evil desires, and then it arose in his mind, that since he had no power to remove himself from committing the deed, that she [Cozbi] was his soul-mate [zivug]). Let us be clear. The Mei ha-Shiloach is not describing the objective reality of Zimri; rather, he is describing the subjective reality that Zimri had about himself. He thought that he had risen to such a high level. So what did Zimri do? He took Cozbi, believing her to be his zivug and had intimate relations with her, believing and being fully convinced in his mind that this was the will of Hashem. Pinchas, however, believed otherwise. He believed that Zimri was mistaken and that, in truth, he still possessed the power to remove himself from committing the deed.
Believing that he was at the ultimate tenth level, Zimri thought that it was impossible for him to guard himself any further. As a result, he believed that his bechirah had been completely eliminated in this matter. The fact that the Yetzer ha-Ra was overpowering him now just convinced him that it was impossible to extricate himself from the situation and that it was, therefore, Hashem’s will for him to have Cozbi. Pinchas, on the other hand, believed that Zimri wasn’t at the tenth level. Perhaps he was at the ninth level, perhaps even lower. Who knows? But whatever level he was at, Pinchas believed that Zimri still had bechirah and that he still possessed the power to resist the Yetzer. And if Pinchas was correct, then it was forbidden for Zimri to have Cozbi. That, in a nutshell, was the existential dispute between Zimri and Pinchas.
All of this is summarized by R’ Tzadok ha-Kohen of Lublin in Tzidkat ha-Tzedek (Perek 43): פעמים יש אדם עומד בניסיון גדול כ”כ עד שא”א לו שלא יחטא כד”ש (ברכות לב.) מה יעשה הבן כו’ ובזה הוא נחשב אונס גמור דרחמנא פטרי’. וגם בהסתת היצר בתוקף עצום שא”א לנצחו שייך אונס, ואם הש”י הסיב את לבו הרי אין חטא זה חטא כלל רק שרצון הש”י הי’ כך (Sometimes a person is involved in such a huge test that it is impossible for him not to sin, as it is taught [as we quoted above from Berachot 32a about the father who prepared his son to sit at the door of the brothel]: ‘What can that son do…?’, and in this he falls into the category of ‘the Torah exempts the one who is coerced’, and also when the Yetzer incites him with power and might, so that it is impossible to defeat it, this relates to coercion, and if Hashem, may He be blessed, turned his heart [in this direction], this sin isn’t a sin at all, rather it is the will of Hashem, may He be blessed). Admittedly, this can be very difficult to accept. Yet, lest we fall into the dangerous trap of justifying all kinds of terrible sins, he concludes with these cautionary words: אבל האדם עצמו א”י להעיד ע”ע בזה כי אולי עדיין היה לו כח לכוף היצר, וכמו ששמעתי בזה מענין זמרי שטעה בזה (But it is impossible for the person himself to testify about himself about this because perhaps he still had the power to subdue the Yetzer, such as I heard about Zimri who made this mistake).
But in truth, the situation was even more complicated than what we have explained so far. Notice what the Mei ha-Shiloach further writes about this: ונעלם ממנו עומק יסוד הדבר שהיה בזמרי, כי היא היתה בת זוגו מששת ימי בראשית, כמו שמבואר בכתבי האר”י ז”ל (The depth of the foundation of this matter with Zimri was hidden from him [Pinchas], because she [Cozbi] was his zivug from the six days of creation, as is explained in the writings of the Arizal). So Zimri’s suspicions were correct after all. Cozbi really was his zivug. What if Pinchas had known this? Would this fact have changed his decision or would it have been irrelevant?
Not only that, but since Cozbi was a Midianite woman who was not born Jewish, Zimri had another argument. Tzipporah was the zivug of Moshe Rabbeinu, and she was a Midianite woman who was not born Jewish, and yet he took her in marriage. So what’s the difference? Rashi answers that we cannot compare the cases because Moshe took Tzipporah before Matan Torah when everybody had the halachic status of B’nei Noach, whereas Zimri took Cozbi after Matan Torah when he had acquired the halachic status of Ben Yisrael (Sanhedrin 82a and Rashi ד”ה בת יתרו מי התירה לך). Alternatively, Moshe could say that he took Tzipporah to the chuppah before he had relations with her, whereas Zimri never took Cozbi to the chuppah at all. But Zimri could point out that the halachah d’Oraita [Biblical law] permits having intimate relations with a woman as a valid form of effecting kiddushin, the first stage of a Torah-sanctioned marriage (Kiddushin 2a): הָאִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית בְּשָׁלשׁ דְּרָכִים…נִקְנֵית בְּכֶסֶף בִּשְׁטָר וּבְבִיאָה (A woman is acquired [in kiddushin] in three ways…she is acquired through money, through a legal document, and through intimate relations).
And on top of all of this confusion, everyone seems to have forgotten that the halachah also states (Sanhedrin 81b): והבועל ארמית קנאין פוגעין בו (One who has intimate relations with an Aramean [i.e. a non-Jewish] woman, zealots may kill him). Everyone forgot, that is, except Pinchas. It is written in Bamidbar 25:7: וַיַּרְא פִּינְחָס (And Pinchas saw). The problem is that the pasuk doesn’t reveal what he saw. Some say that he saw that the name of Hashem was being desecrated, and so he acted extra-judicially in accordance with this halachah in defense of Hashem’s honor (Sanhedrin 81b). Others say that he saw that the Angel of Death had been unleashed upon Yisrael to cause destruction among the nation and that he wanted to prevent more people from being killed, and so he acted in accordance with this halachah (Sanhedrin 82a). Either way, the point is that even though he believed (or better, he knew) that Zimri wasn’t at the tenth level of guarding himself against this lust, and therefore, Zimri was fully capable of resisting the Yetzer ha-Ra, Pinchas was not commanded to do what he did. He acted solely on his own initiative. He pushed aside all this halachic debate, all the thumb-waving, all the shakla v’tarya [שקלא וטריא, give and take], and simply took matters into his own hands.
But how was he able to do this without any fear or concern for reprisals against his own life? The answer is as simple as it is difficult to grasp. Because of his simplicity and humility, he had nullified himself to the true Tzaddik, Moshe Rabbeinu, and thus had risen to the level of a tzaddik himself. Zimri, however, in his arrogance had not nullified himself to Moshe Rabbeinu and thus had an exaggerated evaluation of himself.
Now we can understand what the pasuk means when it says, ‘And Pinchas saw.’ What did he see? He saw everything – clearly.
Leave a Reply